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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Nicole Sciandra appeals the district court's intermediate appellate decision affirming her 
conviction, entered following jury trial held in Twin Falls Idaho. Sciandra maintains her 
argument from intermediate appeal that (I) the magistrate court erred in denying her motion to 
strike the complaint, which that deprives the magistrate court of jurisdiction, and (2) that 
Tomlinson applying Elias Cruz in criminal cases was in error, an error that renders the J.C. 18-
8004 unconstitutional as interpreted by Idaho case law. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On June 11 '\ 2015 Nicole Sciandra was convicted at a jury trial of driving under the 
influence, obstruction, and possession of an open container of alcohol for events that occurred 
March 61\ 2015. At the time of arrest, Sciandra was given a citation. Two days before trial, the 
state amended the citation by filing its initial "amended" long form complaint on June 9th, 2015. 
The defendant filed a motion to strike the complaint that same day. 
The motion to strike the complaint was heard the morning of June 11 1h, immediately 
before jury selection. Prior to the motion hearing the state filed another amended .criminal 
complaint, which did not change the language of Count I, Count 2, or Count 3, but rather 
restated the entirety of the complainant's affidavit. The defense maintained its position that the 
complaint failed to satisfy the legal requirements of a formal complaint, and as such asked the 
court to strike the complaint. The motion was denied. 
The trial proceeded on the new amended criminal complaint, and the state called Officer 
Dan Heil. Officer Heil alleged during his testimony that the defendant obstructed him in the 
performance of his duties by (I) failing to perform the field sobriety tests, (2) resisting as she 
was placed into the patrol car, and (3) by talking over the officer while he read Sciandra the ALS 
form. 
The state called Melissa Bradley, the state forensic technician that performed an analysis 
of Sciandra's blood. Bradley testified to the BAC result of 0.091-the result came from an 
amended Idaho State Police Forensic Analysis Report which increased the reported BAC from 
(l.089 which was initially reported. 
Following the state's direct examination of Bradley, the defense asked to take up some 
issues regarding the scope of cross examination. Noting the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in 
Elias-Cruz, and the Court of Appeals application of Elias-Cruz in Tomlinson, the defense argued 
that Tomlinson 's application of Elias-Cruz into the criminal realm was in error. Defendant took a 
position that strict application of Elias-Cruz and Tomlinson would be unconstitutional. The state 
chose not to argue the issue. The Magistrate Court ruled that it was bound by Tomlinson and 
Elias-Cruz as precedent until the cases were overturned. 
The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. Sciandra was sentence by the magistrate 
court January 4th, 2015. Sciandra timely appealed the judgment of conviction and sentence. On 
appeal, the district court held that the denial of the motion to strike amended complaint was 
proper and that whether Tomlinson was correctly decided is not appealable in this case. Sciandra 
timely appealed the district court's decision on appeal. 
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ISSUES 
I The complaint was legally insufficient because it lacked factual specificity. 
2 Choosing not to highlight plain error in the district court's analysis of the 
second issue on appeal is not dispositive. 
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ARGUMENT 
The complaint was legally insufficient because it lacked factual specificity. 
Both the appellant and the respondent agree that "[s]ubject matter jurisidiction is the 
power to determine cases over a general type or class of dispute." Respondent's brief, p. 3, citing 
State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840 (2011 ). Additionally, both parties agree that subject matter 
jurisdiction is conferred by an information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense in the 
state ofldaho. Respondent's brief, p. 3, citing State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223,228 (2004). The 
parties, however, disagree about whether the jurisdictional document must comply with any 
other requirements to confer subject matter jurisdiction. Sciandra specifically maintains the 
argument first put forward to the magistrate, that the complaint as written did not comply with 
the requirements oflaw because it lacked any factual specificity. 
Both the Idaho Constitution and the Constitution of the United States incorporated the 
right of the accused in a criminal case to know the factual basis of the charges. The United 
States' Constitution mandates that the state inform the accused of"the nature and cause of the 
accusation." Sixth Amendment United States Constitution. 
The Idaho Constitution similarly protects due process oflaw, but the protections afforded 
by the Idaho Constitution are more sweeping than the minimum due process protections afforded 
Idaho Citizens by the United States Constitution. 
Article I Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution declares that "No person shall be held to 
answer for any felony or criminal offense of any grade, unless on presentment or indictment of a 
grand jury or on information of the public prosecutor, after commitment by a magistrate." Article 
I Section 13 similarly closes with the iconic language that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of 
life, liberty or property without due process of law." During the Constitutional Convention the 
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discussion and revision of these amendments focused on addressing how drafters could ensure 
that specific procedure were in place to ensure the rights of the accused in Idaho courts. 
Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho 1889, I 912, ed. I. W. Hart, 
pp. 260-288. The debate over Section 8 hinged on whether the grand jury process should be 
afforded to all serious crimes, or whether the information process was sufficient. Those wishing 
to allow the information process argued that the cost of a grand jury was cumulative and 
unnecessary-with little impact on the outcome. While proponents of requiring the grand jury 
process in all cases were concerned about the power the less formal information process afforded 
prosecutors. As Mr. Reid derided, "My short experience in the territory has been that with most 
magistrates it seems that the dictum of the district attorney is the end of the law." Id. at 266. 
Like Section 8, Section 13 did not pass through the Constitutional Convention without 
discussion. The discussion of Section 13 started by addressing whether specific procedural 
protections needed to be included in the Idaho Constitution, or whether such procedural 
protections need not be enumerated in the constitution because it was the legislature's duty to 
enumerate these procedures. Constitutional Convention, p. 281. 
Early in the discussion a foundational presumption was voiced by Mr. Claggett, "I 
presume there is some provision in here with regard to a party being protected at all events by the 
process of the common law, which will no doubt be adopted by the side of the rules of the 
common law." Id. 
Notably, however, the due process clause that is currently part of Article I Section 13 was 
not included in the original draft language. Section 13, as drafted, instead included specific 
language that "the legislature may provide for" deposition of witnesses in criminal cases under 
certain circumstances. Ultimately, the provision was removed as unnecessary because "the 
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legislature is left under its inherent power to provide for" these types of rules. Constitutional 
Convention, p. 284. 
I agree with the gentleman from Shoshone that it belongs to the code of 
laws to be passed by the legislature. They have authority to pass that, as he says; it 
is their duty to pass it, and it is not the province of the constitutional convention to 
put it in the constitution. It is part of the code of statutes of the state .... 
Id. The provision "was intended to avoid any controversy, when these matters come up in court." 
Id. at 286. As one member noted: 
There are some attorneys that never understand the difference between the 
delegation of power by the constitution of the United States to the national 
legislature, and by the constitution of the state to a stale legislature. In order to 
settle this question, and have it settled in the constitution, is the reason why this 
section was drawn. 
Id. Ultimately, the language about criminal depositions was eliminated. Id. at 287. But the 
discussion of procedure and due process of law prompted amendment of Section 13 to ensure 
that it was clear that all people are entitled to due process of law before deprivation of life, 
liberty, or property. Id. at 287. 
The discussions of the Constitutional Convention show the concern of the drafts that an 
appropriate legal process is followed. Additionally, the drafters patently chose the broad form-
principled-approach that process of law would be required in every case as a part of due 
process, but that the precise method of that process would be determined by the legislature. 
In 1890 Idaho's legislative body adopted a number of sections that fleshed out the 
protective legal process the drafters had envisioned. Idaho Code Section 19-1303 affirmed the 
importance that an "offense charge in all informations shall be stated with the same fullness and 
precision in matters of substance as is required in indictments ... " J.C.§ 19-1303. This fullness 
and precision requires "[a] statement of the acts constituting the offense in ordinary and concise 
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language, and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is 
intended." I.C. § 19-1409. 
Idaho Code § 19-1411 lays out 3 fundamental parts: 
I. The party charged. 
2. The offense charged. 
3. The particular circumstances of the offense charged, when they are 
necessary to constitute a complete offense. 
Idaho cases have similarly upheld the central role of due process. As stated in State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 708 (2009): 
[W]hether a court has subject matter jurisdiction depends on whether the 
charging document is legally sufficient. ... To be legally sufficient, a charging 
document must meet two requirements: it must impart jurisdiction and satisfy due 
process. 
In other words, subject matter jurisdiction in any particular case, requires a charging instrument 
(I) that alleges a criminal act in the state ofldaho and (2) states the particular circumstances in 
such a ways as to not offend the principles of due process. 
The authors were undoubtedly aware of the importance of the principles of due process of 
law when it was incorporated into Idaho's Constitution. The drafters concern is evident in the 
debates referenced above. The drafters concern is also evident as they wrote the Address to the 
People ofldaho, which asked residents to give the constitution "a candid consideration, and 
ratify the same by your suffrages." Idaho Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, p. 2091, Appendix 
B. The address contained the following passage affirming the centrality of due process of law in 
Idaho's Constitution: 
The most intolerable evil, however, under which we have lived for the past 
twenty-five years, has been the changing and shifting character of our judicial 
decisions, by which we have been deprived of the inestimable benefit of judicial 
precedents as a safeguard to our rights of person and property. 
Constitutional Convention, p. 2092. 
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In the present case, the state has not argued that the charging document in this case 
fulfilled the statutory minimum requirements. Instead the state's argument is comprised of two 
steps ( each admittedly more persuasive than the argument that the complaint as tendered and 
amended fulfilled the statutory requirements). The essence of the argument is that the legal 
requirements of specificity are governed only by minimum due process standards of notice and 
prejudice: notice is served by reciting statutory elements, and there can be no prejudice here 
because the complaint had as much information as a Uniform Citation-a name, a date, and a 
statutory citation. 
Undoubtedly jurisdiction ofldaho courts is governed by the Idaho Constitution and 
Idaho's statutory scheme. Thus, the legal sufficiency of a criminal complaint is informed by both 
the historical evidence showing the importance to founders that criminal defendants be afforded 
due process of law, and the legislative acts that subsequently provided the procedural and 
substantive provisions implementing that constitutional mandate. 
Statutes currently referencing factual specificity include: Idaho Code § 19-390 I which 
establishes that the complaint must set out "such particulars of time, place, person and property 
as to enable the defendant to understand distinctly the character of the offense .... "; Idaho Code § 
19-505 providing that a "complaint must set forth the facts stated by the complaining witness, 
tending to established the commission of the public offense and guilt of the defendant."; Idaho 
Code § 19-1411 requiring an indictment to "be direct and certain as it regard ... [t]he offense 
charged ... [t]he particulars circumstances of the offense charged .... "; Idaho Code § 19-1418 
further requiring that the indictment to set out "the act or omission charged as the 
offense ... clearly and distinctly .. .in ordinary and concise language ... in such a manner to enable a 
person of common understanding to know what is intended."; Idaho Code § 19-1303 reading, 
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"The offense charged in all informations shall be stated with the same fullness and precision in 
matters of substance as is required in indictments .... "; and finally, Idaho Criminal Rule 3 
requiring a "written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged." 
At trial, the state failed to allege any factual basis in the original amended criminal 
complaint. In the current appeal, the state has chosen only to incorporate the district court's 
analysis. Indeed, even following the district court's form of analysis makes the conviction in this 
case suspect. The district court considered only notice and prejudice. It found that the amended 
complaint was as sufficient when compared to State v. Griffith, 55 Idaho 60 (1934 ), and State v. 
Pruett, 91 Idaho 537 (1967). However, these cases are unhelpful for determining the sufficiency 
of notice and prejudice, because neither was argued nor decided on that basis. Rather, in each 
case the appellate decision was issued after there was an initial trial in the probate court, and a 
second trial de nova in the district court on appeal. Comparing the complaint in the present to the 
holding in those cases, is highly suspect because it would involve analysis of notice and 
prejudice for a defendant that has been afforded two (2) full trials before the issues was 
addressed. 
Ultimately, the state has not addressed at any level why it is exempt from the statutory 
requirements that Sciandra has argued. It has not truly addressed how due process of law is 
implicated in this case, rather the argument made and maintained at every level is that reciting 
the language of the statutory elements is sufficient for prosecution and conviction-even over 
timely objection. Sciandra posits that the utter refusal to provide factual specificity in a 
compliant is not the due process of law envisioned by Idaho's founders, nor does it comport with 
Idaho's statutory scheme. 
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2 Choosing not to Highlight Plain Errors in the District Court's Analysis of the Second 
Issue on Appeal is not Dispositive. 
On appeal the district court sua sponte chose to decide the second issue on jurisdictional 
grounds. As stated by that court, "Sciandra' s failure to raise an appealable issue is effectively a 
jurisdictional defect." However, Idaho Criminal Rule 54.1 and Idaho Appellate Rule 11 both 
provide for appeal from a final judgment of conviction. In the present case, at each level of the 
appeal, Sciandra filed a Notice of Appeal appealing the judgment, citing Idaho Criminal Rule 
54.1, R. 114-5, and a subsequent Notice of Appeal appealing the Memorandum Opinion on 
Appeal and the Judgment in this case, citing Idaho Appellate Rule 11, R. 203-4. Each Notice of 
Appeal included an affirmation that the party has a right to appeal, what decision or judgment 
was being appealed, and the rule that appeal was made under. 
Each notice also included a statement of the issues appealed. In the first notice of appeal 
the issue was stated as: "The magsistrate's ruling that is was bound by Tomlinson which applies 
the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling in Elias-Cruz (inter alia) to criminal cases." R. 115. In this 
appeal, the issue was stated as: "The District Court erred in affirming the magistrate's ruling that 
the defense would be bound during cross-examination by Tomlinson, which applied the Idaho 
Supreme Court's ruling in Elias-Cruz (inter alia) to criminal cases, in spite of the defendant's 
position that Tomlinson was in error and unconstitutional." R. 204. 
The district court, through minor slip, missed the fact that jurisdiction for the appeal was 
established before the briefing was ordered or completed. Further, the logic of the opinion is 
flawed. A plain reading of the district court· s opinion would prevent a defendant from appealing 
criminal caselaw, which the trial court had held that is was bound by during trial. 
Finally, counsel is aware ofno statutory or case authority that supports the idea that 
mispleading relief in criminal cases, such as may have occurred in this case, is a jurisdictional 
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defect. Ultimately, the defendant respectfully requests that this Court address the actual issue 
raised below, whether Tomlinson applying Elias-Cruz to criminal cases is constitutionally 
permissible, and whether cross-examination of the state's expert witness was properly limited by 
those decisions. Sciandra requests reversal of the previous ruling of lower courts, and requests a 
new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons, Nicole Sciandra respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
district court's appellate ruling affirming the magistrate's denial of the Defendant's Motion to 
Strike, and requests dismissal of the case. The defendant further respectfully requests correction 
to Idaho law interpreting and applying Idaho Code section 18-8004, reversal of the lower court 
rulings, and a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23"ct day of September, 2016. 
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